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We investigate for the individual and relative accuracy of two major market power tests: the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), and the merger simulation model of unilateral effects. 
We propose a methodology to compare the predictive and screening power of both tests by 
implementing them in a hypothetical economy. We find that when a structural econometric 
approach is missed (substantive test) the concentration approach (dominance test) is biased 
upwards. We also find  that the substantive test is influenced by the market size or more 
precisely the market size of the outside good. In particular, when it is large, a decision based 
on the HHI test would have nothing to do with a decision based on the unilateral effects test. 
Still, in the overall, the substantive test performs better in capturing the true situation of the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The identification and quantification of horizontal merger effects is one of the main 
concerns of antitrust authorities. The reason is that horizontal mergers may enhance and/or 
strengthen market power which in turn could facilitate firms to increase prices, reduce output 
choice  or  quality  and  deter  innovation  at  the  expense  of  consumers.
†  Since  competition 
authorities generally delineate welfare as consumer surplus, the previous merger effects are 
perceived as welfare detrimental. A major concern to policy makers is then the availability of 
effective analytical and quantitative tools that make possible to identify whether and to what 
extent a merger will induce market power.  
Responding  to  these  concerns,  a  growing  body  of  models  of  competition  that 
investigate for horizontal merger effects have been proposed in the literature of industrial 
economics. On its side, the literature of applied industrial economics has also considerably 
advanced  in  providing  quantitative  methods  that  answer  the  analytical  complexity  of  the 
theoretical models. In turn, competition agencies have increased reliance on such academic 
contributions  to  merger  analysis  and  updated  their  modes  of  investigation  and 
implementation.  For  instance,  in  2004,  the  European  Community  Merger  Regulation 
(ECMR), has undergone into a reform that modifies the (previously more restraint) scope of 
investigation  for  merger  cases.  In  particular,  the  criterion  of  market  dominance  has  been 
enlarged to include any form of dominance (not only collective dominance) as well as cases 
that do not involve dominance but still entail anticompetitive concerns. This restructuring of 
merger regulation takes concrete form in the accompanying Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
(HMG) which state a list of factors that have to be analyzed in merger cases. Among them, 
two major factors are: the degree of market concentration and the possible anticompetitive 
effects of the merger.
‡  
For the analysis of market concentration the HMG stipulate applying the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI) and its post merger change besides the combined market share levels 
of the undertaking firms. For the assessment of a possible anticompetitive harm, the HMG do 
                                                 
†  EC  Guidelines  on  the  assessment  of  horizontal  mergers  under  the  Council  Regulation  of  the  control  of 
concentrations between undertakings, Official Journal C31 05/02/2004  pp. 5 18, available at: 
http://eur lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52004XC0205(02):EN:NOT:  
‡  In  addition,  countervailing  factors  to  the  increase  in  market  power  like  buyer  power,  entry  and,  more 
importantly, efficiencies gains of the merger are to be analyzed too. Another factor applied to a less extent is the 
failing firm defence. not stipulate specific tools but state that a “but for” analysis is required.
§ Such analysis is 
actually interpreted as a quantitative projection of the (short term) price change as a result of 
the  merger.  Thus,  merger  simulation  models  that  perform  such  a  price  projection  are 
implicitly call and indeed put into practice more and more frequently.
**, †† More specifically, 
whereas  the  HHI  aims  at  determining  market  power  in  terms  of  concentration,  merger 
simulation aims at predicting market power through the so called merger unilateral effects, 
i.e., the increase in prices due to the merger. 
 
In practice, thresholds for market shares and the HHI are systematically applied to 
assess  horizontal  merger  cases  whereas  the  merger  simulation  model  is  mostly  implicitly 
called during the investigation process.
‡‡ The reason for this preference towards the HHI is 
that, in terms of data, the HHI only requires the firms’ market shares of the market under 
analysis.  The  simulation  model,  in  turn,  requires  further  information  about  the  market’s 
demand, and not necessarily but preferable, about the undertakings’ cost structure. In terms of 
implementation, the HHI entails a simple calculation whereas the simulation analysis requires 
structural  econometric  estimation  and  therefore  further  time  and  technical  abilities.  As  a 
result,  the  European  competition  authorities  still hesitate  in  going  forward  with  the  more 
structural economic approach of the simulation model and mostly rely on the HHI criteria to 
close horizontal merger cases.  
Nevertheless, the simplicity of the HHI does not come without a cost. It can accurately 
predict the competitive effects of a horizontal merger only if it takes place in a market of 
homogeneous products. In fact, within such a market structure the predictions of the two tests 
coincide because  the  measure  of  market power,  the  mark up,  resulted  from  the  structural 
analysis is proportional to the HHI. Yet, how much the two methods converge or diverge 
according  to  changes  in  different  factors  of  more  general  merger  models  remains  to  be 
systematically investigated. In particular, in markets of differentiated products, the focus on 
market  shares  and  concentration  is  problematic  and  merger  simulation  is  predominantly 
useful. When the analysis deals with such markets, there is a tradeoff between the simplicity 
                                                 
§ Paragraph 9 of the EC Guidelines for horizontal mergers reads: “In assessing the competitive effects of a 
merger, the Commission compares the competitive conditions that would result from the notified merger with 
the conditions that would have prevailed without the merger”. 
** Other methodologies can also be applied for predicting the effects of the merger, for instance, reduced form 
regressions or price correlations among competitors attempt to disentangle if “parallelism” in prices is due to 
competition or collusion. See Baker and Rubinfeld (1999) for a broad discussion of these alternative methods.  
†† The 2001 Volvio/Scania case (COMP/M.1672) is the earliest example of the application of the simulation 
model; it was performed by Ivaldi and Verboven. 
‡‡  This  is  understood  in  the  HMG  recommendation  of  elaborating  a  hypothetical  post merger  situation  to 
compare it to the pre merger situation. and accuracy of these two market power tests. Indeed, a still open question to analysts and 
practitioners is whether the two types of measures should be substitutes or complements.  
In  this  study,  we  intend  to  answer  under  which  circumstances  one  test  should  be 
preferred to the other. That is, we aim at determining under which conditions the various 
strands of the merger simulation approach, may bring value added, in light of the market 
power test in markets of differentiated products, with respect to the traditional HHI test. In 
particular,  we  want  to  answer  to  questions  like:  How  accurately  can  an  impediment  to 
competition be estimated by the HHI and the simulation quantitative tools?  Is simulation 
analysis  a  more  appropriate  tool  for  accurately  predicting  anticompetitive  merger  effects? 
Does the new substantive test effectively reduces the probability of incurring on errors type I 
and II (prohibiting a pro competitive and clearing an anti competitive merger, respectively) 
compared to the previous dominance test? 
To  address  these  questions,  we  propose  a  generic  methodology  that  evaluates  the 
performance of both market power tests and allows to critically asses the advantages and 
drawbacks  of  the  simulation  analysis  relative  to  the  concentration  test.  Our  methodology 
consists in constructing and econometric workbench in which we implement the two tests and 
subsequently  compare  their  results.  We  do  so,  by  generating  market level  data  of  a 
differentiated  products’  industry  that  supplies  to  heterogeneous  consumers.  In  this  true 
economy a merger takes place and its effects in terms of HHI and price increases (unilateral 
effects) are measured. Then, with the generated data of the true economy, an approximate 
economy is estimated to recover the actual equilibrium of the market (as it is usually done in 
the case-by-case analysis). In this approximate economy, we estimate the unilateral effects 
with the merger simulation model. Then, by correlation analysis we compare the relationship 
between the resulted predictions of the two market power tests. Our results confirm that the 
HHI test tends to be upwards biased compared to the test of unilateral effects. These results 
are sensitive to the choice of the size of the market, or more precisely to the size of the market 
share of the outside good (composed of the goods that do not belong to the actual market 
under scrutiny). In particular, when the size of the outside good is small, a prediction based on 
the HHI test is roughly in accordance with a prediction based on the unilateral effects test. On 
the other side, when the size of the outside good is large, a prediction based on the HHI test is 
different from that based on the unilateral effects test. That is, in the latter case, the increase in 
prices and in HHI, induced by the merger, are not related to each other. Consequently, a 
decision based on the dominance test, HHI would have nothing in common with a decision 
based on the substantive test of unilateral effects.  These results have important implications for merger control. In our example, they 
suggest that when uniquely relying on the HHI test, authorities risk incurring on type I error, 
i.e., prohibiting a merger although there is no serious competition concern. 
In Section 4.2 we describe the two market power tests, namely the HHI dominance test 
and the substantive test of unilateral effects through merger simulation. We also describe the 
required data for the tests to be implemented. In Section 4.3 we expose our methodology and 
describe the generation of the true economy and estimation of the approximate economy. 
Section 4.4 summarizes the results of our comparative experiments and Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Market Power Tests in Horizontal Merger Analysis 
 
In analyzing horizontal merger effects, the main question is whether the merger will 
enhance or strengthen market power, or more specifically, whether it will lead to substantial 
price increases.
§§ In oligopoly theory, the standard measure of a firm’s market power is based 
on the difference of the price the firm’s charges for its product and its marginal costs, that is, 
the  mark up.  In  turn,  this  price cost  margin  is  inversely  proportional  to  the  elasticity  of 
demand.  So,  in  reality,  the  analysis  of  market  power  largely  relies  on  the  estimation  of 
demand elasticities. However, even when elasticities are an important driver to exert market 
power, oligopoly theory does not suggest ignoring market shares or concentration in merger 
analysis. On the contrary, market concentration remains important in the competitive effects 
analysis of mergers. The reason is that market power may be induced by a merger through at 
least  two  distinct  mechanisms:  collusion  (or  coordinated  effects)  between  otherwise 
competing  firms  or,  independent  action  of  the  merging  firms  (non coordinated  effects). 
Within the ECMR the first mechanism is analyzed under the collective dominance concept, 
while the second refers to the more recently introduced concept of unilateral effects for which 
the analysis does not require dominance. Coordinated effects would result from the merger if 
the  reduction  of  competitors  in  the  market  enables  the  remaining  players  to  (implicitly) 
coordinate their behavior to set higher than competitive prices. Unilateral effects would result 
if  the  merging  firms,  facing  inelastic  demands,  can  capture  ongoing  profits  from  a  price 
                                                 
§§ Here, we summarize enhancement of market power as post merger price increases but, the broader concept 
also  includes  reducing  output  or  quality  of  goods  and  services,  deterring  innovation  or  influencing  other 
parameters of competition. increase of the merging substitute product (irrespective of the pricing decisions or actions of 
their competitors).  
Previous  to  the  2004  ECMR’s  reform,  merger  investigation  was  focused  on  the 
coordinated effects of the merger and tended to rely on the market shares of the undertaking 
firms. The prohibition criteria were predetermined according to whether the merger would 
create or strengthen “a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be 
significantly impeded”. After having recognized that focusing on coordinated effects, other 
anticompetitive  mergers  (below  the  dominance  criteria)  could  not  be  covered,  the  new 
prohibition  criterion  of  the  ECMR  now  reads  that  a merger  must be blocked  if  it  would 
“significantly  impede  effective  competition,  in  particular  as  a  result  of  the  creation  or 
strengthening of a dominant position”. This is referred as the SIEC or substantive test. That 
is, the SIEC test has been adopted to include not only coordinated effects but also unilateral 
effects of mergers. 
More  specifically,  the  introduction  of  unilateral  effects  in  the  ECMR’s  SIEC  test 
replaces the traditional analysis of horizontal mergers systematically leading to coordinated 
effects.  This  previous  criteria  was  based  on  the  so called  SCP  (structure conduct 
performance) paradigm. This theory states that the structure of the market (i.e., the number of 
firms) determines the conduct of firms (treated as a black box) that results in performance 
(prices  or  profits).  The  SCP  concept  was  however  undermined  by  both  empirical  and 
theoretical  research.  On  the  empirical  side,  cross sectional  studies  linking  market 
concentration to prices and margins were seriously challenged in grounds of identification, 
causality  and  measurement  error  concerns.
***  On  the  theoretical  side,  the  analysis  was 
replaced  by  the  modern  theory  of  industrial  economics  which  does  not  suggest  ignoring 
market concentration as a factor facilitating market power but which also shows that post 
merger market dominance (or relative large market shares) is not a necessary condition to 
enhance market power.  
In practice, when implementing the SIEC, the first step of the analysis involves the 
definition of the relevant market under scrutiny. A detailed discussion of the advantages and 
drawbacks of this step of the analysis are out of the scope of this study. Once the relevant 
market defined, the second step of the SIEC test implementation involves the competitive 
assessment  of  the  merger.  At  this  stage,  explicit  distinction  between  coordinated  and 
                                                 
*** Also, the use of accounting profits (usually employed as the dependent variable in the regressions) was seen 
as a poor indicator of the firm’s performance resulting from the exercise of market power. unilateral  effects  is  established.
†††  The  reason  is  that  competition  authorities  generally 
consider that coordinated effects are more likely to result from the merger in industries of 
homogeneous products and that unilateral effects are more likely to take place in mergers of 
differentiated products industries. Since it is also broadly recognized that horizontal mergers 
mostly  occur  in  differentiated  product  markets,  a  great  deal  of  importance  is  switched 
nowadays to the analysis of merger unilateral effects. Once the type of the market defined, the 
implementation of the SIEC proceeds to examine the market concentration and the likelihood 
that the merger would have anti competitive effects in the relevant markets (in the absence of 
countervailing factors like buyer power, entry and merger efficiencies).  
More  specifically,  in  implementing  the  SIEC  test,  the  HMG  establish  specific 
thresholds  of  market  shares  and  HHI  when  analyzing  the  concentration  factor.  In  what 
respects  to  the  potential  anticompetitive  harm  factor:  on  the  one  hand,  if  the  concern  is 
coordinated effects, an analysis of the facility of coordination and monitoring among firms 
besides concentration is required. There are however, no specific empirical tools that could 
straightforwardly include the large list of factors facilitating collusion.
‡‡‡ On the other hand, if 
the concern is unilateral effects it is recommended to perform a quantitative projection of the 
(short term) price change as a result of the merger. As explained before, for this analysis, 
merger simulation is implicitly call and indeed put into practice more and more frequently.
 
At this point, it is important to remark that the HHI test of dominance is developed on 
a concept in which coordinated effects are the issue and it can be a poor predictor of harm to 
competition when the case involves unilateral effects and thus competitors of differentiated 
products. One reason is the difficulty in defining the relevant market for implementing the 
HHI test when products are differentiated. Another reason is that oligopoly theory predicts 
that market concentration does not necessarily determine market power in these markets. In 
particular, the two approaches (HHI test and the unilateral effects test) may predict different 
outcomes and direct towards different decisions (allowing or blocking a particular merger). 
Thus, investigating whether the two different tests of market power lead to different positions 
towards the merger and examining their accuracy in the post merger situation is crucial in a 
policy  perspective.  Such  investigations  are  however  inherently  difficult.  They  require  a 
comparison between the actual effects induced by the merger decision, based on one of the 
                                                 
††† In some cases, both such practices may be considered in a merger case which substantially increases the 
degree of complication of the analysis. 
‡‡‡  Those  factors  are  among  others:  entry  barriers,  frequent  interaction  among  firms,  market  transparency, 
demand growth, business cycles and demand fluctuations, innovation and cost asymmetries among firms. See 
Ivaldi et al. (2003a) for a review of the factors facilitating collusion. tests, with the effect that would have prevailed if the contrary decision had been taken. At 
least  two  approaches  have  been  proposed  in  the  economic  literature  to  address  these 
questions. 
The first approach involves the accuracy of the unilateral effects test (the model of 
merger simulation). It consists in gathering historical data on past mergers and to proceed to 
an ex post evaluation of decisions taken by competition authorities. This is however very data 
demanding. First of all, it is fairly difficult to collect data from past merger cases that would 
permit to estimate unilateral effects when it has not been done during the case. Second, it is 
also very difficult to collect data on the industry and merged firms post merger, but necessary 
to check for the accuracy of the test. So, if this approach can be applied in a few cases in the 
best conditions, it cannot be used to draw general conclusions. To our knowledge, analyzing 
the  accuracy  of  merger  simulation  in  merger  decisions  has  been  undertaken  only  twice. 
Hausman  and  Leonard  (2002)  compare  the  observed  change  in  prices  of  the  toilet  paper 
industry in the US after a merger with the predicted ones by the simulation model. They find 
that both price increases (observed and predicted by simulation) were reasonably close. Peters 
(2006) generates predicted post merger price increases and compares them with the observed 
price changes of five mergers in the Airline industry of the U.S. The author finds that the 
observed prices are greater than the predicted by the simulation model and affirms that the 
difference relies in that the simulation model does not consider the possibility of coordinated 
effects. To our knowledge, no equivalent study has been undertaken for an EC case. 
The  second  approach  involves  the  accuracy  of  the  dominance  test.  It  consist  in 
applying the event-study methodology on merger decisions occurred in the past.
§§§ Neven and 
Roller (2002) employed this technique to identify mergers that were considered as pro or anti 
competitive by the market but prohibited or cleared by the EC antitrust authority based on the 
dominance test. In a sample of 100 mergers reviewed from 1990 to 2000 they find that the 
Commission incurred in error type I (blocking a pro competitive merger) in 25% of the cases 
and error type II (allowing an anti competitive merger) in 46% of the cases. The authors 
                                                 
§§§ The event study technique consists in computing the abnormal returns due to the merger announcement. It is 
based on the market model. That is, it runs a regression of the merging firms’ stock returns on a constant and the 
market returns (or industry index) i.e., 
it i mt it R R e α β = + + , where  it R  are the actual returns to firm i at time t 
and mt R  are the actual returns to a market portfolio for firm i at time t. Thus, abnormal returns are obtained by 
subtracting the predicted merging firms’ returns, obtained from estimations for a period prior to the merger, to 
the ones observed for a period after the merger, that is, by computing:  ˆ ˆ ( )
it it i mt AR R α β = + − . The abnormal 
returns are then  summed up  over the  length of the selected post merger period to finally obtain cumulated 
abnormal returns.  
 emphasize  that  (at  that  time)  the  scope  of  the  dominance  concept  and  the  lack  of  the 
efficiency defence in the evaluation of the decision were the sources of such discrepancies. In 
a continuation of the study Duso, Neven and Roller (2007) enlarge the period (until 2002) and 
thus the sample of investigation to 167 mergers. They find that the frequency of error type 1 
slightly decreases to 21% and type II error is found in 23% of the cases. The authors conclude 
that the source of the error relies on the market definition feature of the case and the length of 
the  investigation  phases  among  other  institutional  and  political  factors.  As  the  authors 
recognized however, a strong assumption is needed to perform this test, namely economic 
profits  of  the  merging  (and  non merging)  firms  are  perfectly  reflected  in  a  one to one 
relationship on the firms’ stock prices. In other terms, the whole procedure is based on the 
assumption that financial markets are efficient and that insiders and outsiders (with respect to 
the merger process) have the same information. However, movements in stock prices are due 
to a broad list of events that could happen in the stock market. Thus the true merger effect and 
the effect of the competition authority’s decision might be difficult to isolate. 
  Moreover, this evidence is not precisely  answering our question about  the relative 
accuracy  of the two market power tests competition authorities employed in deciding  for 
clearing of prohibiting mergers. The first group of studies evaluates the predictive power of 
the merger simulation model and the second group of studies evaluates the predictive power 
of the dominance test. But they do not compare the relative accuracy of the two tests. Thus, 
this evidence is not answering if the two different tests lead to different positions towards the 
merger. We consider that, in order to compare the HHI and the merger simulation approaches 
in  terms  of  predictive  and  screening  power,  a  specific  methodology  is  needed.  This 
methodology  has  to  be  general  enough  to  avoid  the  drawbacks  of  the  approaches  just 
discussed  above.  We  propose  an  approach  based  on  the  econometrics  of  differentiated 
products  markets  that  allows  implementing,  at  the  time,  both  such  tests  to  evaluate  their 
predictive accuracy in detecting market power enhancement due to the merger. 
Before explaining our proposed methodology we describe both market power tests, 
highlighting their pros and cons, to subsequently implement them in our workbench. 
  
2.1. Market Concentration and HHI 
The European HMG thresholds for market shares, HHI and its changes in the relevant 
market are considered as first indicators of the change in competitive conditions due to the 
merger. In order to applied the thresholds it is necessary to first define the relevant market under scrutiny. By doing so, the boundaries of competition between firms are supposed to be 
identified and delineated. The HMG recommend delineating the relevant market in terms of 
demand substitability.
**** Once the relevant market is defined, market shares for each supplier 
can be calculated on the basis of their individual product sales or revenues.
†††† If a combined 
post merger market share of the merging firms is lower than 25 % there is no risk of effective 
competition whereas one higher than 50 % may be evidence of the existence of a dominant 
position.
‡‡‡‡ The HHI is calculated as the sum of squares of the individual market shares of all 
firms in the market. The index involves therefore the number of firms and their dispersion on 
the market. It ranges from close to zero (in an atomistic market) to 10000 (in a monopolistic 
market) and it gives greater weight to larger competitors. That is, if  J  is the number of total 
single product firms competing in the market under scrutiny and  j s , is the market share of 




j j HHI s
= =∑ . In turn, market shares j s , are defined as  j q Q, where  j q  is the quantity of 
product j sold in market Q, and 
1
J
j j Q q
= =∑ .  So, the main issue in computing the HHI is to 
define Q, the relevant market. In turn, the HHI criteria state that the merger is unlikely to raise 
competitive concerns if it takes place in markets with: 
•  post merger HHI below 1000. 
•  post merger HHI between 1000 and 2000 and  HHI below 250. 
•  post merger HHI above 2000 and  HHI of less than 150.
§§§§ 
Two pitfalls are worth mentioning about the merger effects predicting power of the 
HHI test in the context of differentiated product industries.  
First, the HHI is constructed under the assumption of homogeneous goods. Indeed, the 
unique case in which the HHI yields accurate predictions of market power, is the one in which 
firms compete in quantities with homogeneous products, constant elasticity of demand and 
                                                 
**** See the Commission notice on the definition of the relevant market available at  
http://eu ex.europa/eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997Y1209(01):EN. 
†††† It has also being proposed to use the profit shares in the market instead of the output shares. See Mariuzzo, 
Walch and Whelan (2004). 
‡‡‡‡ See http://eur lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52004XC0205(02):EN:NOT 
§§§§ There are exceptions to these rules. They are: 
a)  If a merger involves a potential entrant or a recent entrant with a small market share. 
b)  If one or both parties are important innovators in ways not reflected in their market shares. 
c)  If there are significant cross shareholdings among the market participants. 
d)  If one of the merging firms is a maverick with a high likelihood of disrupting collusive conduct. 
e)  If indications of collusive behaviour are present. 
f)  If one of the pre merger parties has a market share of 50% or more. symmetric constant marginal costs.
***** Under markets of differentiated products the HHI tells 
little  about  the  underlying  competitive  structure  of  the  market.  In  these  industries,  the 
competitive  constraint  of  firms  is  determined  by  the  degree  of  substitability  between  the 
various differentiated competing products. In particular, firms with small market shares may 
well be able to extract high mark ups if their product is highly differentiated and firms with 
large market shares may well be following intensive competition if consumers perceive their 
products  as  close  substitutes.  That  is,  in  differentiated  products  industries  the  higher  the 
degree of substitutability between the merging firms' products, the more likely it is that the 
merging firms will rise prices significantly. In this context, market shares are not robust to 
inappropriate market delineation and thus if wrongly defined they may not reflect the degree 
of  competition.  As  a  result,  the  HHI  is  a  poor  indicator  of  market  power  in  markets  of 
differentiated products. Here, the essential instrument to analyze market power is the ability to 
set high prices and this is correctly done only if computing price elasticities. Nevertheless, 
sometimes the difficulty of obtaining price elasticities returns the analysis to the definition of 
market shares as indirect evidence of their value but still market shares are not the issue. 
The second pitfall of the HHI has to be with its post merger computation and thus with 
its corresponding change ( HHI). In order to compute the post merger HHI, it is assumed 
that the post merger market shares remain the same and are not recalculated according to the 
post merger  equilibrium  (they  are  summed  up  in  their  pre merger  values).  That  is,  the 
computation of the change in the HHI does not take into account the oligopolistic interaction 
of the market. It ignores that horizontal merger models predict that the merging firms’ market 
shares will tend to overestimate (underestimate) an increase in the market power (through 
unilateral effects) of the merger if the merging firms’ products are especially distant (close) 
substitutes within the relevant markets.  
 
2.2. Merger Simulation of Unilateral Effects  
2.2.1. Unilateral effects 
 
                                                 
***** That is, the HHI test is derived from the Cournot model of quantity competition with homogeneous goods. 
To illustrate this, recall that in this model the mark up of product j is expressed as :
j j p c p s η − = , where 
j c  is 
the constant marginal cost of product  j and  η  is the price elasticity of aggregate demand. It turns out that if 
marginal costs are all equal and constant, then the average unit cost is 
1
J
j j j c s c
= =∑ . By multiplying both sides of 




= ∑  and summing over all firms, we get 
2
1 / / /
J
j j HHI p c p c s η η
= = ≡ − =∑ . So, for a fixed 
elasticity of demand, the mark up or market power measure is proportional to the HHI. The  pioneer  work  of  Deneckere  and  Davidson  (1985)  show  that  in  markets  of 
differentiated products, and in the context of price competition, a merger always results in 
higher  prices,  unless  strong  synergies  are  a  consequence  of  the  merger.  In  the  unilateral 
effects models, higher prices result even if the industry members are not coordinating their 
actions, that is, even when collusion is not an option. The main element driving the results of 
these models is product differentiation. When products are differentiated they are not perfect 
substitutes and consumers may (not) easily switch to a non perfect substitute product when 
facing a price increase. Merging firms producing substitute goods will benefit from raising 
prices to some degree, because they will recapture some of the customers who switch in favor 
of  what  previously  was  a  competing  product.  In  turn,  responding  to  merging  firms  price 
increases,  outsiders  will  also  find  profitable  to  unilaterally  raise  prices  (since  in  price 
competition, prices are strategic complements). The term unilateral arises precisely from the 
fact  that  merging  and  non merging  firms  act  in  their  unilateral  self  interest  (without 
coordinating  among  them).  In  other  words  and  as  explained  above,  in  the  differentiated 
products industries, a post merger price increase does not depend on the merged firm being 
the  dominant  player  in  the  market,  but  instead,  on  the  substitutability  of  the  products  in 
question.  Since  products  substitutability  is  measured  through  demand  sensitivity  or  more 
precisely through price elasticities, the analysis of unilateral effects of mergers strongly relies 
on the computation of the own and cross elasticities of the products in the market under 
scrutiny.  
An important point to mention here is that within the analysis of unilateral effects, 
market definition is not an issue. The economic analysis is the same regardless of whether the 
case is generating high concentration within a narrow market or concentration will stay low 
within  a  broader  market.  The  reason  is  that,  the  profitability  of  a  price  increase  in  the 
unilateral effects model depends on the demand system and factors determining the proximity 
between the merging products’ firms, and not on drawing lines between products that are 
inside or outside the relevant market. In contrast, market definition is an issue within the HHI 
analysis. The index will be much higher if high market shares are involved in a tiny market 
than if they are low in a broader market. 
 
2.2.2. Merger simulation model 
 
Merger  simulation  is  the  formal  use  of  the  unilateral  effects  model  to  make 
quantitative predictions of price increases due to the merger. It ought to match the closest possible the critical features of the market under analysis. Merger simulation of unilateral 
effects proceeds in three main steps. The first step is the specification of the two building 
blocks of the merger model, namely, demand and supply. The second step consists on the 
estimation or calibration of the parameters of such functions. The third step uses the estimated 
parameters (from the second step) to predict the post merger prices and market shares and 
compare them to the pre merger ones. At this step, efficiency gains (i.e., fixed decreases in 
marginal  costs)  can  be  implemented  in  the  simulation  exercise.  From  this  comparison, 
unilateral effects are finally measured. That is,  the merger simulation model of unilateral 




The challenge of the first block of merger simulation, namely demand, is to deal with 
markets of differentiated products. Two types of demand models have been proposed in the 
literature. The one defining consumer preferences on product space or simply demand system, 
and the one defining consumer preferences in characteristic space or discrete choice demand. 
A demand based on product space has the inconvenient that the number of parameters to 
estimate grows exponentially with the number of products under analysis. The reason is that 
the number of these parameters is directly linked to the own and cross price elasticities. For 
example, if the market is composed of J products, a demand system specified in product space 
requires estimating 
2 J  parameters: for each product j, one own price elasticity plus  1 J −  
cross price elasticities. Some methods have been proposed to limit this number of parameters. 
Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) suggest a multistage budgeting procedure under which 
products are ranked into distinct levels of expenditure. The procedure consists in assuming 
that a representative consumer chronologically allocates his income in an upper, lower and 
bottom level of demand. This sequential expenditure of consumers is supposed to capture the 
differentiation  of  products.  Then,  at  the  bottom  level  of  demand  an  AIDS  (Almost  Ideal 
Demand System) is estimated to obtain the relevant products’ cross price elasticities. The 
advantage  of  the  method  is  that  it  has  desirable  flexibility  properties  of  elasticities.  The 
disadvantage is however, that the greater the restrictions built, in terms of the chronological 
allocation of income, the greater the sensitivity of the resulting price predictions. Moreover, the  system  still  remains  intractable  when  the  number  of  products  at  the  bottom  level  is 
large.
††††† 
 This drawback is avoided by employing the second category of demand, the discrete 
choice  one,  which  includes  the  various  kinds  of  logit  models.  In  these  models,  product 
differentiation is captured by defining products as bundles of characteristics.
‡‡‡‡‡ For example, 
the pioneer work of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) defines a car by its size, horsepower, 
number of miles the car can drive per gallon of gasoline, quality of the service network, etc. 
Nevo (2000) defines the ready to eat cereal by its contents of calories, sodium and fiber. 
Furthermore,  the  technique  enables  to  introduce  in  the  analysis  not  only  the  products’ 
observed  characteristics  but  also  the  unobserved  characteristics  to  the  analyst.  This  is 
important because unobserved characteristics represent factors that are observed by the firms 
that  produce  them  and  perceived  by  consumers  but  are  not  quantifiable  by  the  analyst. 
Examples of such characteristics are the product’s quality or the effect of advertising on the 
product. It is clear that such characteristics are a decisive factor for buyers’ choice and firms’ 
profits. In addition, the logit demands allow analyzing the likely impact of a new product 
before  it  is  actually  introduced  into  the  market.  The  methodology  consists  in  modeling 
consumer  preferences  as  a  function  of  products’  characteristics  instead  of  products 
themselves. This technique gives rise to a model that is easily tractable because the number of 
parameters  to  be  estimated  will  be  linked  to  the  number  of  characteristics  the  product  is 
composed of. The most straightforward version of these models is the multinomial logit. Its 
simplicity relies on the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This 
property implies that any pair of products, say ( , ) j l , will have the same cross price elasticity 
with respect to any third product in the market, say  h, i.e.,  jh lh η η = , where  jh η  and  lh η  are 
the cross price elasticities of products  , , j l  respectively, with respect to product h. The nested 
logit model, partially relaxes the IIA property by segmenting consumers’ decision into nests 
(groups of similar products). It offers more flexible substitution patterns because the nesting 
procedure  implies  greater  substitution  among  products  within  nests  than  between  (across) 
nests.  The  mixed logit  or  random  coefficients  model,  offers  the  largest  flexibility  in 
substitution patterns because it introduces the interaction between products’ characteristics 
                                                 
†††††Within this demand system context the most flexible specification is the metric approach proposed by Slade 
and Pinkse (2004). It only constraints demand elasticities to be in function of the “closeness” (or distance) of its 
competitors in product characteristic space. That is, this specification does not impose any a priori substitution 
pattern  except  for  the  assumption  that  brands  that  have  similar  characteristics  might  be  closer  substitutes. 
However, this approach has also the disadvantage of estimating (too) many parameters. 
‡‡‡‡‡ See Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Verboven (1996), and Nevo (2000). and consumers’ characteristics (the random component of the utility). In doing so, substitution 
patterns entirely depend on the products characteristics and not on products belonging to the 
same  group.  That  is,  consumers  will  substitute  to  products  of  similar  characteristics  and 
consumers  with  similar  characteristics  will  have  similar  preferences  for  the  differentiated 
products. Undeniably, the main advantage of the discrete choice models is their parsimony in 
the number of parameters to be estimated. This number is independent of the number of 
products in the market under scrutiny. It is substantially reduced from 
2 J  to the number of 
characteristics the product is composed of.
§§§§§ Thus, one can typically include many more 
products  within  the  discrete  choice  approach  and  still  obtain  fairly  accurate  parameter 
estimates.  
Crooke et al. (1999) evaluate how different demand functions affect the predictions of 
the merger simulation model of unilateral effects. They found that merger simulation predicts 
relatively lower price increases with the logit demand function than with the AIDS function. 
The reason is that in the logit demand, own price elasticities increase relatively fast as prices 
rise whereas in the AIDS own price elasticities increase relatively slow as prices rise. 
For its advantages, our study employs the discrete choice logit demand. As we will see 
below, we model a random coefficients utility function to generate consumer choices in the 
true economy to ensure larger flexibility on consumer substitution patterns, and we model a 
multinomial logit demand in our approximate economy for its relative advantages in terms of 
tractability.  
 
2.2.2.2 Supply  
The other building block of merger simulation is supply. For the supply side of the 
market two features are required, an assumption about the nature of competition among firms 
and  an  assumption  about  their  cost  function.  Concerning  the  nature  of  competition,  the 
Bertrand model is the most convenient within the differentiated products framework. Indeed, 
some merger simulation studies have tested the fit of this assumption. For instance, Nevo 
(2000) and Pinkse and Slade (2004) performed a statistical test on observed and estimated 
average margins and found that the Bertrand hypothesis could not be rejected. The Bertrand 
model allows describing firms as multiproduct producers which is required to ensure realism. 
This  is  important  in  the  analysis  of  merger  effects  because  when  a  multiproduct  firm 
considers increasing the price of one of its products, it takes into account how much of the 
                                                 
§§§§§ In a random coefficients model it is twice the number of characteristics indeed, one time for the mean of 
such characteristic and a second time for the variance. lost demand will go to its other products. In fact, not considering the multiproduct aspect (and 
modeling firms as single product entities) would lead to a downward bias in the estimate of 
the firm’s mark up. The reason is that in the single product context, firms’ mark ups are only 
in  function  of  their  corresponding  own  price  elasticity.  This  ignores  the  fact  that  a  price 
increase in brand j will lead to an increase in demand for other goods produced by the same 
firm. Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) found that when assuming single product firms, the 
mark up  of  product  j  is  17%  lower  than  the  mark up  of  the  same  product  if  assuming 
multiproduct firms instead.  
Concerning the cost structure, it is  common practice to rely  on the assumption of 
constant marginal costs.
****** The reason for opting to a simple marginal cost function is that, 
in merger analysis, careful attention to the supply side becomes important only when the 
concern shifts to whether changes on supply (due to efficiencies or remedies) would offset the 
exercise of market power. 
At this point, it is important to insist in that the simulation model undertaken with the 
discrete choice demand addresses the question of defining the potential size of the market and 
not the relevant market. In merger simulation, the observation of product’s sales is not enough 
to compute market shares and it is necessary to introduce the concept of the potential market 
size  as  distinct  from  the  observed  market  size.  Indeed,  the  potential  market  size  can  be 
assumed or estimated from the available market level data. The reason is that the discrete 
choice demand takes into account that consumers may choose the outside alternative, that is, 
the composed good which gathers all the products that are not of direct interest for the merger 
under investigation but that could act as substitutes. Thus, in the Bertrand industry the issue 
turns into what differentiated products one should include in the model. This is however not 
problematic because the model implies that the prices of the excluded goods remain constant. 
As the prices of all substitutes of the merging products actually increase as a result of the 
merger, any exclusion of substitutes biases downwards the price increase effect of the merger. 
Still, since the increase in prices of most non merging goods is small, their exclusion does not 
imply a substantial bias of the estimated unilateral effect of the merger. In contrast, when 
implementing  the  HHI  test  one  has  to  carefully  define  the  relevant  market  because  the 
predictions of the anticompetitive effects strongly rely on such definition.  
In what follows we explain how we develop our methodology of comparison of these 
two predictive merger effects tests, the HHI and the merger simulation model.  
                                                 
****** More flexible cost structures can also be modeled. For an example see Ivaldi and McCullough 2005.  
 
3.  A Methodology of Comparison 
 
The  methodology  we  propose  to  compare  the  two  market  power  tests  (HHI  and 
unilateral effects) consists in the generation of a hypothetical economy which serves as a 
benchmark to simulate horizontal mergers. The unilateral effects and the concentration index 
can be measured and compared in these hypothetical situations. While this method is very 
flexible  because  it  allows  for  a  large  set  of  experiments,  the  conditions  under  which  the 
hypothetical  economy  is  built  are  crucial  for  the  accuracy  of  the  approach.  That  is,  the 
robustness of the results depends on the features of the setup itself. It is obvious that the 
approach  provides  an  approximation  of  reality,  but given  that  the  assumptions  we  use  to 
generate the hypothetical economy are fairly general, our examples should provide accurate 
comparisons of the two market power tests. More specifically, to develop our experiments we 
construct a workbench consisting on a dataset about a market composed of heterogeneous 
consumers  and  multiproduct  firms  producing  differentiated  products.  We  generate  this 
economy by random draws. It represents the true economy in our analysis. Within this true 
economy we observe the actual market equilibrium in terms of prices and market shares as 
well as consumer preferences. Then, a merger takes place in this economy. We thus observe 
post merger  equilibrium  prices  and  market  shares.  Since  we  observe  pre  and  post merger 
market  shares  in  this  true  economy,  we  can  compute  the  true  post-merger  HHI,  and  its 
corresponding  true  delta.  That  is,  we  consider  post merger  observed  market  shares  to 
accurately calculate the concentration index. We also compute the HHI as it is usually done 
by the antitrust authorities, i.e., by summing up the pre merger market shares of the merging 
firms, we call this index the ex-ante post-merger HHI. To sum up, in this true economy we 
observe post merger the true HHI and unilateral effects i.e., true increase in prices.   
Next,  with  the  data  available  in  the  true  economy  we  estimate  an  approximated 
economy as it is usually done in merger cases. That is, we assume that we observe product 
characteristics and cost factors to estimate demand and pricing decisions of the merging firms. 
In this approximated economy, we implement the merger simulation model to estimate the 
post merger equilibrium in prices and market shares. That is, we estimate the unilateral effects 
of the merger.  Hence, with the available data we can evaluate the predicting power of the two market 
power tests, the HHI and the unilateral effects through simulation. We do so, by comparing 
the true post-merger HHI and its corresponding change with the wrongly computed ex-ante 
post-merger  HHI,  in  the  true  economy.  Then,  we  evaluate  the  accuracy  of  the  merger 
simulation model. We do so, by comparing the true and estimated unilateral effects, that is, 
the true and estimated increase in prices due to the merger. Finally, we evaluate the relative 
performance of both such tests, the HHI and the merger simulation model of unilateral effects 
by  contrasting  their  corresponding  predictions  in  terms  of  market  power  effects.  This 
procedure is summarized and depicted in Diagram 1 and in the following paragraphs:  
 (a)  A  true  economy  is  generated  and  the  initial  equilibrium  in  prices,  denoted  by 
vector  0
t p , and market shares are obtained. These are the pre merger data that the 
competition  authority  usually  observes.  A  merger  is  then  proposed  and  the  initial 
market shares are used to compute the initial HHI denoted as  0 HHI
t .  
(b) In the true economy, we allow the proposed merger to occur. Using the pre merger 
market shares, the ext-ante post-merger HHI and its corresponding delta are computed 
and denoted  0,1 HHI
t  and  0,1 HHI
t   , i.e.,  0,1 0 0,1 HHI HHI HHI
t t t   = − . These are the index’s 
level and change as usually computed by the competition authority. 
(c) Still, in the true economy, the post merger equilibrium in true prices, denoted by 
vector  1
t p   and  true  market  shares  is  computed.  These  post merger  data  are  not 
available on real cases.  
(c1) The true post-merger HHI and its corresponding delta are computed and 
denoted by  1 HHI
t  and  1 HHI
t   , i.e.,  1 0 1 HHI HHI HHI
t t t   = − . That is, this delta is 
the true post-merger measure of change in concentration. 
(c2) The unilateral effects in the true economy are observed, i.e., the difference 
in pre and post merger prices are computed and denoted 
t p   . 
(d) Using the generated pre merger data of this economy, the approximate economy is 
estimated by fitting a demand and supply system. In other words, demand and supply 
conditions are estimated to fit the observed pre merger equilibrium. 
(e)  In  this  approximated  economy  the  merger  is  simulated,  post merger  prices  are 
obtained and denoted by vector  1
a p  and estimated unilateral effects are denoted by 
1  
a p . That is, steps (d) and (e) are the usual tasks that the analyst performs by applying 
the simulation approach to a real case. (f)  Tests’  accuracy:  Observed  changes  in  true  prices  and  true  market  shares  are 
contrasted with the results predicted by the HHI test and the unilateral effects test. 
We now turn into the detailed description of the methodology 
(g) Tests’ comparison: The predictions of the HHI test and the unilateral effects test 
are confronted. 
We now turn into the detailed description of the methodology. 
 
3.1. Generation of the true economy 
For the implementation  of the market power tests we require data about products, 
firms, and consumers. These data are generated from underlying assumptions about products 
characteristics, consumer preferences, firms’ cost structure and behavior.  
Hence, we first  generate a set of differentiated products  composed of  a bundle of 
characteristics.  
Second, we generate a population of consumers whose utility is modeled such that it 
depends on common and own tastes for the characteristics of the products and on income. 
That is, we model the most flexible discrete choice demand system, namely the  random 
coefficients logit, to ensure realistic and accurate substitution patterns. Then, individuals are 
assumed to make a discrete choice i.e., to select the product among the whole variety of 
existing products that gives them the greatest utility. For this, a maximization program of 
utility is built up to derive consumer choice. By summing up consumers’ choices demand in 
terms of market shares is determined.  
Third, firms are modeled as profit maximizing multiproduct entities that set prices for 
each of their differentiated products taking into account that their competitors do the same. 
They  are  assumed  to  produce  with  constant  marginal  costs  which  in  turn  depend  on  the 
characteristics of the products. In order to set their maximization program that determines 
prices, we assume that even if they do not perfectly know consumers tastes, they know the 
components  entering  their  utility  up  to  a  distribution  function.  So  that  firms  are  able  to 
compute  their  expected  demand  according  to  this  distribution  and  to  finally  decide  about 
prices.  
Jointly estimating the solutions of these two maximization programs we obtain the 
equilibrium of the market in term of prices and quantities (or market shares). In what follows 
we further describe the generation process of each element of our true economy. 
 3.1.1.  Generation of products 
 
On the supply side of the economy we generate a market composed of five firms 
indexed  by  f,  where  f=1,…,F  and  F=5.  These  firms  are  symmetric  in  size  and  in  cost 
structure.  Each  firm  f  produces  a  set  of  100  differentiated  products  denoted  by  f   .  We 
generate  then  500  differentiated  products  indexed  by  1,..., j J =   and  J=500.  Their 
differentiation relies on the characteristics they are composed of. We assume that some of the 
product characteristics are observed and some are unobserved (observed by producers and 
consumers but unobserved by the analyst). The former can be physical characteristics like the 
horsepower, size and air conditioning of a car, or the calories, sodium and fiber content of the 
ready to eat cereal. The latter can account for the quality of the product, promotional activity 
or other unquantifiable factors.
†††††† We also create market segmentation by positioning each 
product j in one of four categories g=1,…,G, and G=4. Categories are clusters of products of 
similar characteristics, for example, large and small size would be two distinct categories of 
cars and high or low content of fiber would be two distinct categories of the ready to eat 
cereal. Each product j is thus generated as  a  set  of  six  observed  characteristics  grouped  in 
vector  j x  where  j x  is composed of  K=5 observed characteristic and a category g, that is, 
j jk jg x x x = + , the sixth characteristic is the unobserved one denoted by  j ξ .  
Two of the product characteristics,  1 x  and  2 x , are generated as continuous random 
variables  with  a  normal  distribution.  The  remaining  three  observed  characteristics  are 
generated as discrete random variables with a binomial distribution. That is,  k x  is generated 
such that  ( )
2 0, k k x N σ →  for k=1,2 and  ( )
2 0, k k x U σ →  k=3,4 and 5. The category variable, 
jg x  is generated with a uniform distribution by giving a fraction of the interval [ ] 0,1  to each 
group  g,  i.e.,  ( )
2 0, jg g x U σ → .  Each  random  variable  has  either  an  associated  probability 
function  (in  the  discrete  case)  or  a  probability  density  function  (in  the  continuous  case). 
Finally,  the  unobserved  characteristic,  j ξ ,    is  generated  as  a  continuous  variable  with  a 
normal  distribution  such  that,  ( )
2 0, j U ξ ξ σ → .  All  the  variables  following  a  normal 
distribution  are  assumed  to  have  a  zero  mean  and  their  variance  is  generated  by  a 
randomization routine.  
                                                 
†††††† The unobserved characteristic is anything observed by consumers and producers but that is not quantifiable 
by the analyst. Demand shocks could also be represented by unobserved characteristics.  
3.1.2.  Generation of individuals utility and choices  
 
For  the  demand  side  of  the  market  we  generate  a  population  of  M  heterogeneous 
individuals  and  potential  consumers  indexed  by i,  where  i=1,…,M    and  M=500,000.  The 
population M represents therefore the potential size of the market. Individuals are endowed 
with an income and assumed to have common and idiosyncratic tastes for the attributes of the 
product  j.  In  real  databases,  examples  of  individual  characteristics  that  may  reveal 
idiosyncratic  tastes  are  related  to  demographics,  i.e.,  age,  family  size,  race  or  education 
among others. We represent individual i’s income by  i y  and we cluster his idiosyncratic tastes 
in the variable  i v . Then, the indirect utility of consumer i for purchasing product  j, denoted 
hereinafter by  ij U , is assumed to be a function of the observed and unobserved product j’s 
characteristics  j x   and  j ξ ,  the  price  of  the  product,  j p ,    individual  i’s  income,  i y   and 
idiosyncratic characteristics, i v . That is,  
   
  ( ) , , , , , ij i i j j j U y v x p ξ   (1) 
 
  More specifically, consumers’ utility is modeled as a random coefficients such that: 
 
  ( ) , ij i i j jk ik j ij k U y p x α β ξ ε = − + + + ∑   (2) 
 
where  i α  is consumers i’s marginal utility of income and marginal disutility of price,  ik β  is a 
K dimension vector of individual specific taste coefficients and  ij ε  is a mean zero stochastic 
term, specific to both, individual i and product j that reflects differences in tastes and/or other 
non measured factors.  
Within  the  discrete  choice  approach,  the  specification  of  the  demand  side  of  the 
market is completed with the introduction of the outside good. This is a set that encloses all 
the other alternatives to which the consumer could allocate income. If the outside good is not 
included in the analysis, market shares cannot be computed with the single observation of the 
inside goods. That is, the introduction of the outside good is necessary because without it, a 
price increase of the merging firms’ products would not change the quantities purchased. The reason is that in the absence of the outside good consumers would be forced to choose one of 
the inside goods and demand would only depend on differences in prices. This would imply 
that a general price increase would not decrease demands for the inside products and then 
computing demand elasticities to infer market power would have no sense. Since the outside 
good represents a composite good, its price and characteristics are not defined, therefore the 
utility  of  choosing  the  outside  good  resumes  to:  0 0 i i i i U y α ε = + .  As  i i y α   will  eventually 
vanish because it is common to all products, it is natural to normalize the mean utility of the 
outside good equal to zero, i.e.,   0 0 i U = .  
Individual heterogeneity,  i v , is introduced through the marginal utility of income,  i α , 
and by decomposing the utility of each of the characteristics of the product,  ik β , into an 
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Thus, the expression that generates individuals’ choices translates into: 
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 That is, the utility function can be expressed as the sum of four elements.
‡‡‡‡‡‡ A 
marginal utility of income,  ( ) i i y α α + ɶ , which will further vanish since it is common to all 
products.  A  mean  utility,  j δ ,  common  to  all  consumers  and  that  contains  the  vector  of 
parameters to be estimated denoted  ( ) , k θ β α = . A term  ij    that accounts for the individual 
tastes  for  the  products’  characteristics,  ( ) , i ik i v β α = ɶ ɶ .  That  is,  ij     is  the  fraction  of 
heteroskedastic  deviations  from  the  mean  utility  that  captures  the  effects  of  the  random 
coefficients model. And finally, an error term  ij ε , which is assumed to be identically and 
independently  distributed  across  products  and  consumers  and  to  follow  an  extreme  value 
distribution such that its cumulative distribution is  ( ) ( ) ( ) ε ε − − = exp exp F .   
This structure of consumers’ characteristics ensures flexible and reliable substitution 
patterns because it allows for interactions between consumer and product characteristics. This 
means that it takes into account consumers’ idiosyncratic tastes which in turn implies that 
price elasticities will depend on consumer real preferences for the products’ attributes and not 
only on the products’ market shares. For example, this specification would imply that larger 
families prefer larger cars or richer families are less responsive to price increases.
§§§§§§ 
In order to generate consumers’ utility expressed in equation (4.5) we draw a vector of 
individuals’ income following a log normal distribution such that  ( ) ( )
2 log , i y y N y σ →  with 
predetermined mean and variance  y  and 
2
y σ . The distributions of consumers idiosyncratic 
tastes,  ( ) , i ik i v β α = ɶ ɶ  are drawn as random variables that follow a normal distribution such that 
( )
2 0, ik k N β σ → ɶ  and  ( )
2 0, i N α α σ → ɶ  for k=1,…,K, where 
2
k σ  is the variance of the individual 
taste  for  product  characteristic  k  and 
2
α σ   is  the  variance  of  the  random  coefficient  that 
accounts for individual wealth and price effects. Accordantly, we construct a corresponding 
identity covariance matrix such that it is independent of the level of income  i y . 
To generate a vector of choices, consumers are assumed to purchase (one unit of) the 
good that gives them the highest utility.  For this, we build up a maximization program for 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡‡ Note that if we do not add the idiosyncratic tastes for the product characteristics, consumers’ utility is only 
a function of the common parameters α and 
k β  such as: 
ij i jk k j j ij k U y x p α β α ξ ε = + − + + ∑ . 
§§§§§§ Introducing the interaction of price and the unmeasured variable 
i α ɶ  may also help to capture sources of 
wealth that the analyst cannot measure and different degrees of price sensitivity among individuals with the same 
wealth. 
 equation (4.5). Then, for a given vector of prices, we provide initial values to the common 
parameters  ( ) , k θ β α = , and to the individual parameters  k σ  and  α σ  of the random variables 
involved. Recall that the vector of observed and unobserved characteristics  j x  and  j ξ  was 
previously generated. That is, given the exogenous variables and the arbitrary vector of prices, 
consumer i is assumed to choose product j if:  
 
  ( ) ( ) , , , , ; , , , , ; , i j j j ij i l l l il U v p x U v p x ξ ε θ ξ ε θ ≥   (6) 
 
for l j ≠ . Note that since each individual purchases only one good, the number of consumers 
choosing good j divided by the size of the market M gives the market share of good j,  j s . 
 
3.1.3.  Generation of supply  
 
Firms  are  assumed  to  produce  differentiated  goods  at  a  constant  marginal  cost 
(independent of output). We then generate a log linear constant marginal cost function for 
each product j that depends on three distinct components: the observed characteristics of the 
product,  j x , an exogenous variable that is assumed to affect the cost structure but not demand, 
j z , and an unobserved term denoted by  j ω . The random variables,  j ω  and  j z , are generated 
with  a  normal  distribution  such  that  ( )
2 0, j N ω ω σ →   and  ( )
2 0, j z z N σ → .  Then,  marginal 
costs of producing the differentiated product j,  j mc  is expressed as:   
 
  ( ) exp j k jk z j j k mc x z γ γ ω = + + ∑ ,  (7) 
 
and generated by giving initial values to the parameters of the exogenous variables,  k γ  and 
z γ . Once marginal costs  generated, we  assume that the F multiproduct firms compete in 
prices. In maximizing their profits with respect to their own products’ prices, they take into 
account  their  competitors’  strategies  as  well  as  their  potential  demand.  Then,  the  profit 
function of each firm  1,... f F =  that produces the set of differentiated products,  f   , at a 
marginal cost,  j mc ,  is expressed as: 
   ( ) ( ) , , ; .
f
f j j j
j
p mc Ms p x ξ θ
∈ 
Π = − ∑   (8) 
 
Firms are assumed to perfectly know their own marginal cost of product j,  j mc , the 
potential size of the market M and an approximation of the demand for their product j. That is, 
as  in  Berry  Levinsohn  and  Pakes  (1995)  we  assume  that,  in  order  to  determine  prices, 
producers have information about the population’s preferences and are able to estimate an 
expected demand for their product. In particular, we assume that firms perfectly know the 
components entering consumers’ utility function including their heterogeneous characteristics, 
i.e., idiosyncratic tastes  i ν , income  i y  and  ij ε , up to their distribution function. Denote the 
distribution function of consumers characteristics as  ( ) ε ν , ,y P . Then, knowing that there exist 
a set of consumers with values v that induce the choice of product j, defined as  j A , such that: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) { } , , : , , , , , ; , , , , , ; , j j j j j l l l l A v y  U v y x p U v y x p ,  l j ε ξ ε θ ξ ε θ = ≥ ≠   (9) 
 
firm producing good j will compute its expected demand, by capturing the heterogeneity in 
the population through  ( ) P ⋅ , which in the discrete choice context is the probability of product 
j being chosen and thus the expected market share for product j. Denote this expected market 
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  (10) 
 
This  market  share  is  a  function  of  the  characteristics  and  prices  of  all  the  goods 
competing  in  the  market.  According  to  the  specification  of  the  logit  preferences,  (4.10) 
translates into:  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
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  (11)  
That is, firms integrate the logit probabilities over the random components  ( , ) k β α ɶ ɶ  
which correspond to the idiosyncratic individuals’ characteristics  ( , , ) v y ε . In order to solve 
for  the  multidimensionality  of  the  integral  (4.11)  we  undertake  its  computation  with  a 
simulation technique. We obtain an estimation of P by carrying out ns=100 random draws 
from the distribution of  ( ) , , P y ν ε  and then replace P by Pns (the simulated estimator of P). 
That is, giving initial values of θ , the vector of simulated market shares that firms integrate in 
their maximization problem is:  
 
  ( ) ( )
1
1
, , , , , , , , , .
ns
j i ns j i
i
s v p x P f v p x
ns
δ θ δ θ
=
= ∑ ɶ   (12) 
 
Since the demand of product j firm f faces is the probability of choosing good j times 
the number of consumers in the economy, that is,  ( ) , , ; j Ms p x ξ θ , the profit function of firm j 
translates into: 
 
  ( ) ( ) , , ; .
f
f j j j
j
p mc Ms p x ξ θ
∈ 
Π = − ∑ ɶ   (13) 
 
Firms  chose  then  prices  of  products  so  as  to  maximize  profits  knowing  that  their 
competitors do the same. In other words, assuming firms enroll in Bertrand competition the J 
first order conditions for the J products are:  
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) , , ;












− − = =
∂ ∑
ɶ
ɶ   (14) 
 
 
If   is a J by J matrix whose element ( ) , j l  is given by 
 
 
       if    and   are produced by the same firm,   






∂ −  ∂   = 


  (15)  
then, in matrix notation the first order conditions are expressed as: 
 
  ( ) ( )[ ] , , ; , , ; 0, s p x p x p mc ξ θ ξ θ −  − =   (16) 
 
or 
  ( ) ( )
1 , , ; , , ; . p mc p x s p x ξ θ ξ θ
− = +    (17) 
 
With this firms’ optimization program we finally generate the pre merger prices of all 
products J. Equation (4.17) indicates that the price of product j is equal to the marginal cost of 
product j plus a mark up term which is in turn in function of product’s j price elasticity (the 
derivative of the market share of product j with respect to price). In other words, the price 
cost margin for each product j is in function of consumers’ willingness to pay for product j. 
Firms are then confronted to compute the price elasticities of the market shares defined by:  
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ɶ
  (18) 
 
The elasticities here refer to the percentage change in the market share of product j in 
response to a change in the price of product l, where  f l∈  . 
Summing up the equilibrium of the true economy in terms of market shares and prices 
is fully characterized by equations (4.6) and (4.17).   
 
3.1.4.  Merger simulation  
 
We  assume  that,  before  and  after  the  merger,  the  merging  firms  set  prices 
independently.  That  is,  Bertrand  competition  remains  after  merger  which  eliminates  the 
possibility of cooperative behavior. Market size, consumer characteristics, the total number of 
products J, the characteristics of the products  jk x ,  jg x  and  j ξ  and marginal costs  j mc  are 
assumed to remain the same after merger. Then, using the estimated pre merger marginal cost 
and demand parameters we predict the post merger equilibrium prices. We do so by changing firm’s f ownership set of products, i.e., its  f   . For example, if firm 1 and 2 merge, what 
previously was the set of production  1    and  2    post merger becomes  1 2 ,    for which we 
solve the new equilibrium post merger conditions. That is, we take into account the new 
merged firm modifies its maximization problem internalizing a new joint set of substitute 
products. The reason is that when increasing the price of good 1, the merger firm anticipates 
that it can compensate the loss of consumers buying product 1 by a gain of consumers who 
will switch to product 2. Since products are substitutes, these gains (higher price of 1 and 
higher demand for 2) outweigh the loss of the lower demand for good 1. The same effect 
derives for good 2, that is, when increasing the price of product 2, the firm will outweigh the 
loss of forgoing demand of good 2 by an increase in demand for good 1. Moreover, since in 
price  competition  prices  are  strategic  complements,  whenever  the  price  of  a  competitor 
increases, the other competitors’ response will be to increase prices too. As a result, in the 
post merger equilibrium, merging and non merging firms’ prices are higher. 
 
3.1.5.  Data from the true economy 
 
With the previous generated data we observe an economy with available information 
about pre merger prices, quantities, market shares, products’ and individuals’ characteristics. 
Prices are obtained from the maximization program of firms’ profits, equation (4.17). Market 
shares  are  obtained  from  the  maximization  program  of  individual’s  utility,  equation  (4.5) 
provided (4.6) is satisfied. Products’ characteristics and consumers’ idiosyncratic tastes are 
obtained from random routines. We also observe the size of the potential market and of the 
actual market (the quantities bought for the 5 firms’ products) for which market shares and 
initial index of concentration HHI are computed.  
We denote the pre merger data of the true economy as  0
t p ,  0
t s  and  0
t HHI , for the vector 
of pre merger equilibrium prices and market shares of the J products and the initial HHI, 
respectively. The subscript 0 denotes the period prior merger and the superscript t denotes true 
economy. After the merger simulation of firms 1 and 2 we obtain the equivalent information, 
i.e., prices, quantities, market shares, HHI and its corresponding delta induced by the merger. 
We denote these post merger data by  1
t p  and  1
t s , for the vector of post merger equilibrium 
prices and market shares where the subscript 1 accounts for the period after merger. In other 
words, we observe in the true economy, the true unilateral effects of the merger, i.e., the 
increase in prices, denoted by 
t p   . Moreover, by summing up the pre merger market shares of the merging firms 1 and 2, 
say,  01
t s  and  02
t s , we compute the ex-ante post-merger HHI , the  0,1
t HHI . This corresponds to 
the index that competition authorities actually compute when facing a merger case. We also 
compute  the  true  post-merger  HHI,  the  1
t HHI   which  takes  into  account  the  firms’  post 
merger  market  shares  resulting  from  merging  and  non merging  firms’  reaction  to  price 
competition, i.e., from the unilateral effects.  
To summarize, in our generated market, we observed supply side data that include: pre 
and post merger product characteristics, prices and market shares of the J products as well as 
the corresponding HHIs. The consumers (demand) side data that include: the potential market 
size  M,  the  actual  market  size  of  the  market,  j js ∑ ,
*******  consumers’  income  and 
information  on  the  distributions  of  variables  that  account  for  the  idiosyncratic  tastes  of 
consumers. Note that whereas prices and market shares will change after merger, product and 
consumers characteristics are assumed to remain the same post merger. 
At  this  stage,  we  have  all  the  necessary  data  from  the  true  economy  to  perform  a 
structural econometric analysis of merger unilateral effects through simulation.  
 
3.2. Estimation of the approximate economy 
In  order  to  estimate  the  unilateral  effects  of  the  merger  taking  place  in  the  true 
economy, we use the required and available data: products’ characteristics, prices and market 
shares. To estimate demand we employ the discrete choice multilogit model. To derive the 
pricing equations, we keep the assumption of price competition and constant marginal costs. 
We  then  simultaneously  estimate  our  functional  forms  of  demand  and  supply  to  obtain 
estimated pre merger equilibrium prices and market shares. We next simulate a merger to 
predict the post merger equilibrium prices and market shares. That is, here too we use the 
parameters estimated based on pre merger conditions to solve for the post merger conditions. 
 
3.2.1. Demand, supply, pre and post-merger equilibrium  
 
For the demand side we consider the multinomial logit specification as the suitable 
benchmark  for our approximate economy because it is the most conservative in terms of price 
                                                 
******* Note that 
0 j j M s s = + ∑ , where 
0 s  is the market share of the outside good. increase predictions induced by the merge.
††††††† The model assumes that each individual i’s 
indirect utility from consuming good j is linear in characteristics and expressed as: 
 
  , ij j j j ij U x p β α ξ ε = − + +   (19) 
 
where  j x  is a vector of observed characteristics,  j p  is the price and  j ξ  is an unobserved (by 
the econometrician) characteristic of product j. Here, product characteristics are treated as 
exogenous,  although  product  prices  are  determined  within  the  model.  ij ε   represents  the 
distribution  of  consumer  preferences  around  the  mean  utility  and  it  is  assumed  to  be 
identically and independently distributed across both consumers and products, which means 
that their choices are ruled by the same probability distribution (in this context it accounts for 
the individual specific deviation from the mean).  
Note that with this specification α , which represents the marginal disutility of price, 
and  β , the vector of taste parameters, are assumed to be invariant across consumers. That is, 
in this model both, observed and unobserved characteristics are assumed to be the same across 
individuals and then consumers’ heterogeneity enters only through the error term  ij ε . The 
specification can be re arranged as: 
 
  , ij j ij U δ ε = +   (20) 
 
where  j j j j x p δ β α ξ = − +   is the element accounting for the mean utility of product j. Then, 
the discrete choice market share function,  j s , is derived from the principle that consumer i 
will purchase the good that gives him the highest utility. Since each individual is defined by a 
vector of random choices,  [ ] 1 2 , ,..., ij i i iJ ε ε ε ε = , the set of individuals choosing good j will be 
( ) ( ) , , , , j ij ij il I x p U U j l ξ α β ε = = ≥ ∀ ≠ where ( ) ( ) 1 2 1 2 , ,..., , , ,..., J J x x x x p p p p = = and 
( ) 1 2 , ,..., J ξ ξ ξ ξ = . In other words, product j will be chosen if an only if for all  0 l ≥  and for 
                                                 
††††††† This property  has been  shown by Crooke et al. (1999). They use Monte Carlo experiments  for four 
demand systems (linear, log linear, logit and AIDS) and show that the predicted price increase of a merger is, 
ceteris paribus, highest with the log linear demand (i.e. constant elasticity) followed by the AIDS and then by 
the  logit  demand  (the  linear  having  the  lowest  price  increase,  however  its  disadvantages  –notably  having 
negative prices  make it unappealing). l j ≠ ,  ( ) ( ) Pr Pr ij il ij il ij il U U dP ε ε δ δ ε ≥ = − ≤ − =∫ .  If  ij ε   follows  the  extreme  value 
distribution such that exp( exp( ε )) the choice probability of product j is expressed as:  
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exp













+ − + ∑







,  for the outside good.
1 exp
J
l l l l
s
x p β α ξ
=
=
+ − + ∑
  (22) 
 
These  choice  probabilities  are  measures  of  the  market  shares.  Applying  Berry, 
Levinhson and Pakes (1995) methodology, the ratio of the logarithm of the two market shares 
gives us the linear demand expression for product j to be estimated as:  
 
  0 ln ln . j j j j s s x p β α ξ − = − +   (23) 
 
Recall that from the generated market data of the true economy we observe the market 
shares,  j s ,  0 s , the product characteristics,  j x  and the price of product  j p . Here, the term  j ξ  
represents the unobserved element of demand. With this demand function own and cross price 
elasticities are: 
 
  ( ) 1 if ,
otherwise.
j j j l
jl
l j l l
p s j l s p




− − = ∂  = = 
∂  
  (24) 
 
This  last  expression  of  elasticities  indicates  that  the  ratio  between  the  choice 
probabilities of j and l is independent of the rest of the choices included in set of products J. 
This is the so called Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives property (IIA). It implies that, 
conditional  on  market  shares,  substitution  patterns  do  not  depend  on  the  mean  utility 
generated from the product  j j j j x p δ β α ξ ≡ − + , but instead on the market shares. That is, in 
the setting of differentiated products, the IIA means that the substitution patterns between one 
product and all alternative products are proportional to their respective market shares. For 
example, any two goods j and k with the equal market shares,  j k s s =   are constrained to have equal own price elasticity,  jj kk η η =  and cross price elasticity with any third good,  jl kl η η = , 
regardless of whether both,  j and k,  are highly differentiated.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ This implies that the 
anticompetitive effects of mergers will indeed depend on the market shares of the firms. Still, 
the issue is not the definition of the relevant market to compute market shares, as it is for the 
computation of the HHI. Despite these restrictions, the multi logit model still provides the 
most natural default assumption for substitution patterns. In fact, assuming substitutability as 
a function of the share of the good is generally seen as an appealing assumption even if the 
IIA property does not define what it means for all goods in the choice set to be equally good 
substitutes to each other.  Imposing the  IIA property  ensures that all  estimated elasticities 
make sense, i.e., that substitute products actually have positive cross elasticities of demand.  
   For  the  estimation  of  the  approximated  economy’s  supply  side,  as  previously,  we 
assume that symmetric multiproduct firms compete in prices and that their marginal cost for 
producing  each  differentiated  product  j,  j mc ,  is  linear  in  product’s  characteristics.  Then 
marginal costs are estimated by: 
 
  ( ) ln , j j j mc w γ ω = +   (25) 
 
where  j w   is  a  vector  of  product  j’s  characteristics,  γ   is  the  vector  of  parameters  to  be 
estimated and  j ω  is the error term that accounts for unobserved costs. Firms are assumed to 
maximize their profits with respect to prices, taking into account that their competitors do the 
same, the profit equation for each firm f is:  
 
  ( ) ( ),
f f j j j j p mc Ms p
∈  Π = − ∑   (26) 
 











  (27) 
 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ This is a consequence of assuming an independently and identically distributed additive error and not of 
any specific distributional assumption on the errors. Again, the pricing equation for product j is equal to its marginal cost plus a term that is 
inversely related to its elasticity of demand,  jj η . Note that  j p  and  j s  are known and  / j j s δ ∂ ∂  
is  obtained  from  the  estimation  of  demand.  Then,  for  the  joint  estimation  of  supply  and 
demand, we substitute the term  / j j s δ ∂ ∂ , by  ( ) 1 j j s s −  from (4.24) to finally obtain a pricing 
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  (28) 
 
where  j w  is observed and α  is estimated from the demand equation.  
We account for the endogeneity problem of prices and market shares by estimating the 
system  of  demand  and  pricing  equations  with  the  non linear  three stage  least  squares 
estimator  (NL3SLS)  using  instruments  previously  generated  from  the  data  of  the  true 
economy. As conventionally (see Berry, 1994), these instruments are created as: the number 
of products per category, the number of products per firm and per category, the number of 
products per firm and per each of the discrete variables.  
Again,  the  pre merger  equilibrium  in  terms  of  prices  and  market  shares,  of  the 
approximate economy, is fully characterized by equations (4.23) and (4.28). We denote the 
pre merger prices and market shares vectors by  0
a p  and  0
a s ,  respectively, where the suffix 0 
accounts for the pre merger period and a for the approximated economy. 
 
3.2.2. Merger simulation in the approximated economy  
 
To simulate the merger, we proceed as before. That is, using the estimated pre merger 
marginal costs’ and the demand’s parameters we predict the post merger equilibrium prices 
and market shares. We denote this information by  1
a p , and  1
a s  where the suffix 1 accounts for 
the post merger period and a for the approximated economy. From these data we can then 
compute the unilateral effects of the merger in terms of the increase in prices, that is, 
a p   .  
 3.3. Evaluation and Comparison of the HHI and Unilateral Effects Tests 
We can now precede to the evaluation and comparison of the two market power tests, 
namely, the dominance test of HHI and the unilateral effects test. For this, we generate the 
true economy and estimate the approximated economy for two distinct cases: large and small 
market share of the outside good. Thus, we run our experiments 210 (150) times for cases of 
the  market  share  of  the  outside  good  being  large  (small)  to  obtain  confidence  intervals. 
Accordingly, the statistics resulted from our experiments are averaged figures.  
In  each  of  the  experiments  we  asses  the  performance  of  the  dominance  test  by 
evaluating the difference of the ex-ante post merger HHI and its corresponding change, that 
is,  the  0,1
t HHI   and  0,1
t HHI   ,  respectively,  with  the  true  post merger  HHI,  and  its 
corresponding delta, the  1
t HHI  and  1
t HHI   , respectively. That is, we compare the HHI as 
actually computed by the competition authorities with the value it should have been obtained 
if correctly computed. 
Second, we evaluate the predicting power of the substantive test by comparing the 
estimated  merger  unilateral  effects  of  the  approximated  economy, 
a p   ,  with  the  true 
unilateral effects, i.e., true increase in prices, 
t p   . 
Third,  we  asses  the  relative  performance  of  both  such  tests  of  merger  effects  by 
comparing their predicting results to each other. That is, we analyze if the unilateral effects 
test, 
a p   , and the dominance test,  0,1
t HHI  and  0,1
t HHI    are in accordance with each other and 
with the true merger effects, namely 
t p    and  1
t HHI   . See Diagram 1 for a recapitulative of 
the procedure of the evaluation and comparison of the two market power tests. 
 
 
4.  Results of Comparisons 
 
Four main results can be drawn from our statistical analysis. They are gathered in 
Tables 4.1 to 4.4 below. The first one concerns the accuracy of the HHI as a predictive market 
power test of merger effects. The second one concerns the accuracy of the merger simulation 
approach to asses the merger unilateral effects. The third and fourth ones concern the relative 
performance of both tests. 
As expected, the first result reveals that the levels of the post merger HHI are biased 
upwards when they are computed ex ante, that is, before the new post merger equilibrium is obtained. See Tables 4.1 and 4.2. In our experiments, the average pre merger value of the 
HHI in the true economy,  0
t HHI , is of 2016 (2018) for the case of small (large) market share 
of the outside good –omitting decimals . Its average ex ante post merger value,  0,1
t HHI , is  
2809 (2808) for small (large) market share of the outside good. The average true post merger 
HHI, that is, the average value of the HHI computed with the post merger equilibrium market 
shares,  1
t HHI ,  is 2698 (2726) for small (large) market share of the outside good. The upward 
bias of the HHI levels is not large but it is significant, it is of 4.14 percent (3.06 percent) for 
small (large) market share of the outside good. This upwards bias is also revealed in the 
change of the HHI. In our experiments, the ex ante average change,  0,1
t HHI   , is of 793 (789) 
under small (large) market share for the outside good. In the same order, the average true 
change,  1
t HHI   , is of 682 (708). In both cases, large and small market share of the outside 
good,  the  true  change  in  the  HHI  is  lower  than  the  ex ante  post merger  change,  that  is, 
1 0,1
t t HHI HHI   <   . This upward bias results because the HHI does not take into account that 
when products are substitutes and firms do not benefit from any efficiency gains (revealed in 
post merger lower marginal costs), the merging firms find profitable to increase prices. In 
turn, the non merging firms raise prices too but to a smaller extent. The increase in prices of 
the merging firms more than compensates their lower demand which reveals that the share of 
the merging entity is smaller when one takes into account the unilateral effects. Thus, the 
post merger HHI computed ex post is smaller than the post merger HHI computed ex ante. 
This first result implies that in a market structure like the one of our true economy, 
namely, five symmetric firms producing equal number of differentiated products, with similar 
market shares among them, the ex ante post merger HHI level and its respective delta would 
point towards blocking the merger. That is, when one is not able to compute the post merger 
equilibrium (the merger unilateral effects), the computations of the post merger HHI and its 
delta (as usually done by competition authorities) are biased upwards. This in turn would 
increase the risk of type I error, that is to say, the risk to prohibit a merger although there are 
no serious competition concerns.  
The second result concerns the accuracy of the unilateral effects test performed with 
the merger simulation model. This result is very much related to the size of the market, or 
more  precisely  to  the  size  of  the  market  share  of  the  outside  good.  In  the  approximated 
economy, the average estimated change in price,  1
a p   , is 10.52 percent (2.79 percent) if the 
market share of the outside good is small (large). In both cases, these figures are higher than the true increase in price,  1
t p    which are 1.99 percent (0.80 percent) when the market share 
for  the  outside  good  is  small  (large).  These  numbers  indicate  that  the  simulation  model 
overestimates the price effect of the merger and that such overestimation is higher when the 
share of the outside good is defined as small. In particular, in the case of small market share 
of the outside good the test would suggest to prohibit the merger because of large unilateral 
effects. In the case of large market share of the outside good, the unilateral merger effects test 
would take the opposite decision. In other words, the evaluation of unilateral effects by means 
of the simulation tool is very much influenced by the real size of the market. Not taking into 
account for the fact that the market could be much larger might strongly bias upwards the 
measure of unilateral effects. It is important to mention that it would be useful to evaluate to 
what extent this result depends on the specification of the simulation tool.
§§§§§§§ Also, if we 
would  have  accounted  for  efficiency  gains,  the  results  of  the  merger  simulation  exercise 
would have been different, in particular, we would have obtained a lower post merger price 
increase,  1
a p   .
********  We  did  not  introduce  any  possible  efficiency  gains  in  our  merger 
simulation model because our objective is to compare it with the dominance test. That is, 
given that in the analysis of the HHI there is no explicit way to trade off cost reductions we 
found useless to make use of them in the simulation model. 
 
 
TABLE 1  
STATISTICS OF THE EXPERIMENTS (SMALL  0 s ) 
    Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
Firm 1's market share  1 s   19.87  1.69  15.18  24.43 
Firm 2's market share  2 s   20.01  1.93  14.42  25.32 
Merging entity's market share  1,2 s   39.87  2.23  34.51  46.41 
Outside option's market share  0 s   0.03  0.00  0.02  0.04 
Aggregate elasticity  η   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Estimated average change in prices  1
a p     10.52  1.83  6.42  17.06 
True average change in prices  1
t p     1.99  0.74  0.41  4.86 
Bias on change in prices    494.74  236.14  210.10  1779.08 
Average pre merger   0
t HHI   2016.20  11.33  2000.79  2067.37 
Average ex ante post merger   0,1
t HHI   2809.56  89.00  2620.73  3112.53 
                                                 
§§§§§§§ For example, the restrictions on the substitution patterns that impose the logit model imply higher price 
increases compared to a more flexible demand system like the nested logit.  
******** In this context, the simulation model assumes that reductions in marginal costs are, to some extent, passed 
through consumers in the form of lower prices.  Average true post merger  1
t HHI   2698.77  65.67  2579.44  2923.18 
Bias on HHI levels    4.14  3.58   5.85  14.53 
Average ex ante change in HHI  0,1
t HHI     793.36  89.49  584.50  1074.10 
Average true change in HHI  1
t HHI     682.57  66.56  549.30  895.62 
Bias on change in HHI    16.95  14.74   19.73  58.71 
 TABLE 2  
STATISTICS OF THE EXPERIMENTS (LARGE 0 s ) 
    Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
Firm 1's market share   1 s   19.85  1.84  14.91  26.06 
Firm 2's market share   2 s   19.93  1.85  14.60  24.29 
Merging entity's market share  1,2 s   39.79  2.29  33.41  46.71 
Outside option's market share  0 s   68.29  1.20  64.65  72.09 
Aggregate elasticity  η   1.54  0.05  1.38  1.67 
Estimated average change in prices  1
a p     2.79  0.48  1.76  4.01 
True average change in prices  1
t p     0.80  0.51  0.01  2.72 
Bias on change in prices    814.35  2248.01  7.24  26286.68 
Average pre merger HHI  0
t HHI   2018.59  13.27  2000.75  2091.06 
Average ex ante post merger HHI  0,1
t HHI   2808.56  89.54  2608.67  3136.29 
Average true post merger HHI  1
t HHI   2726.68  79.42  2574.98  2990.68 
Bias on HHI levels    3.06  3.77   4.72  16.04 
Average ex ante change in HHI  0,1
t HHI     789.97  91.35  557.11  1076.28 
Average true change in HHI  1
t HHI     708.09  80.86  548.49  961.68 
Bias on change in HHI    12.53  15.61   17.31  74.28 
 
As explained before, the HHI is based only on the inside product market shares. When 
the  outside  good  matters  and  its  size  is  imperfectly  known,  the  HHI  cannot  discriminate 
between situations corresponding to different levels of the outside good’s market share. This 
has a critical implication: in this context, the HHI cannot be a good proxy for measuring 
market power, i.e, for measuring the ability of firms to raise prices above competitive levels. 
For instance, when the market share of the outside good is large, meaning that customers are 
not very captive, the post merger HHI can be large even though the merging firm has little 
market power over consumers. This is supported by our third main result which bears on the 
correlation between the true change in prices,  1
t p    and the estimated change in HHI,  0,1
t HHI   . 
In Tables 4.3 and 4.4, one observes that there is almost no correlation between these two 
figures when the market size of the outside good is large. In turn, they are correlated at a 
thirty five percent level when the size of the market share of the outside good is small. In 
other words, when there is a reason to account for an outside good, i.e, when its market share 
is  not  negligible,  the  change  in  prices  and  the  changes  in  HHI  due  to  a  merger  are 
independent. This last implies that, when the market share of the outside good is important, a 
decision based on the change in HHI is not related to a decision based on the unilateral effects 
test. Finally,  our  fourth  result  is  related  to  the  relative  accuracy  of  the  HHI  and  the 
unilateral effects test. The correlation between the true change in prices  1
t p    and the estimated 
change in price  1
a p    is substantially higher, in both cases (small and large size of the market 
share of the outside good), than the correlation of the former with the change in concentration, 
0,1
t HHI   . When the market share of the outside good is small (large) the correlation of the true 
price increase with the estimated one is 0.54 (0.14). These numbers are much larger than the 
correlation  of  the  true  price  increase  with  the  change  in  the  ext ante  HHI  which  is  of 
0.35(0.06)  when  the  market  share  of  the  outside  good  is  small  (large).  This  last  result 
indicates that the substantive test of anticompetitive harm implemented with the simulation 
model  performs  better  in  capturing  the  true  situation  of  the  market  compared  to  the 
dominance test of concentration. 
 
TABLE 3  
CORRELATION STUDY ON THE EXPERIMENTS (SMALL  0 s ) 
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TABLE 4  
CORRELATION STUDY ON THE EXPERIMENTS (LARGE  0 s ) 
  0,1
t HHI     1
t HHI     1
a p     1
t p    
         
0,1
t HHI    
 
1.00       
1





     
1







   
1












HHI   is the average ex ante change in HHI, 
1
t
HHI    is the average  
ex ante post merger HHI, 
1
a
p   and 
1
t
p   are the estimated and  the true  





5.  Conclusion  
 
The  objective  of  this  chapter  is  to  compare  the  accuracy  of  two  different  tests  of 
horizontal mergers effects in terms of market power in a context of differentiated products. 
The first test consists in estimating the unilateral effects of a merger through the merger 
simulation model. That is, it consists in computing the increase in prices facilitated by the 
higher market power due to the merger. The second test is based on the idea that market 
power is closely  related to market concentration and more specifically it conjectures that 
higher market concentration increases the scope of market power. Market concentration is 
measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) which is in turn computed as the sum of 
the squared market shares of all firms in the market. In order to compare the absolute and 
relative performance of these two market power tests we put them into practice in a merger 
case  and  asses  the  relation  of  their  respective  predictions.  To  do  so,  we  construct  and 
econometric  workbench  based  on  a  differentiated  products  industry  that  supplies  to 
heterogeneous consumers. More specifically, our procedure consists in the generation of a hypothetical  economy  which  serves  as  a  benchmark  to  simulate  hypothetical  mergers  in 
which unilateral effects and the concentration index are measured and compared. 
We find that the HHI test tends to be upwards biased compared to the test of unilateral 
effects. In addition, our experiments show that the results of the merger simulation model are 
sensitive to the choice of the size of the market, or more precisely to the size of the market 
share of the outside good (composed of the goods that do not belong to the actual market 
under scrutiny). On the one side, when the size of the outside good is small, a prediction 
based on the HHI test is roughly in accordance with a prediction based on the unilateral 
effects test. On the other side, when the size of the outside good is large, a prediction based on 
the HHI test is different from that based on the unilateral effects test. Consequently, a decision 
based on the dominance test, the HHI is not related with a decision based on the substantive 
test of unilateral effects. In our correlation analysis that compares the relationship between the 
resulted predictions of the two market power tests with the true post merger effects, we found 
that while the dominance test is only slightly correlated with the true increase in prices, the 
unilateral effects test is substantially higher correlated. Thus, in our context, the unilateral 
effects test performs better in predicting merger effects than the index concentration test.  
From  our  results,  our  conclusions  are  twofold.  On  the  one  side,  in  terms  of 
implementation and taking into account technical and time constraints, we conclude that the 
simulation  model  is  a  very  useful  tool  to  complement  the  HHI  analysis  but  it  is  not  a 
substitute for it. The reason is that the higher cost in terms of time, data and technical abilities 
that the simulation model require prevent it from being an easy substitute of the dominance 
test. On the other side, in terms of predictive accuracy, we conclude that market concentration 
remains important in analyzing merger effects since, all things equal; a higher concentration 
test makes unilateral effects more likely. However, the advantage of the merger simulation 
approach compared to the market concentration approach is that the former can indeed offer 
an estimate of the price effect induced by the merger. The structural simulation model tells 
what matters, why, and by how much i.e., it identifies where more evidence is needed and it 
does not necessarily requires market definition. In our view, the simulation approach is more 
complete than the HHI approach since the former looks at both demand and supply whereas 
the latter regards only at the supply side of the market.  
Finally, we recognize that further research is still required to improve our workbench 
of comparisons, for instance, building up the hypothetical economy with: asymmetric firms, a 
more flexible cost function and estimating the approximate economy with a more flexible 
demand function like the nested logit one. References 
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A.1 Presentation of the testing procedure 
 
DIAGRAM 1: PRESENTATION OF THE TESTING PROCEDURE 
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 A.2 Histograms of Average Changes of HHI and Prices  
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